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Introduction
Traditional saving models assume that people formulate their consumption plans period by period, gathering and processing all information they need about the state of the economy without facing any "planning" cost. However, survey evidence suggests that such costs do exist and that they lead to infrequent planning or even a complete lack of planning.
Furthermore, empirical work on planning 1 …nds that not everybody's behavior departs from the assumptions of the standard permanent income/life cycle model: people di¤er in their propensity to plan.
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In this paper, I try to address both these …ndings. I focus on heterogeneity in planning and explore the links between propensity to plan, wealth inequality and asset prices in general equilibrium. I assume that agents are heterogenous only in their propensity to plan:
attentive agents plan their consumption period by period, while inattentive ones plan every other period. Then, I study the implications of this assumption in general equilibrium. I
show that di¤erences in the propensity to plan generate wealth heterogeneity and volatile asset prices. Moreover, I …nd that infrequent planners are less likely to invest in stocks.
In a canonical consumption/saving model, wealth heterogeneity can be explained by di¤erences in preferences structures. Di¤erences in discount factors or risk aversion, for example, might do the job, as well as, bequest motives. However, the empirical work in Lusardi (2003) and Ameriks et al. (2003) , among others, suggests a link between di¤erences in wealth accumulation and propensity to plan. According to this evidence, infrequent planning has an impact on wealth accumulation, thereby causing considerable wealth heterogeneity among households with similar economic and demographic characteristics. More precisely, infrequent planning leads to lower saving and wealth accumulation. But this …nding is at odds with the existing literature on infrequent planning: in a partial equilibrium model with …xed interest rates, Reis (2006) shows that consumers who plan infrequently face more uncertainty 3 and save more for precautionary reasons.
1 Both Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) and Venti (2006) review recent empirical evidence on planning and saving behavior 2 Heterogeneity in planning behavior might arise if planning depends on other people's experience, as individuals learn how to plan from their siblings or their parents, or if planning is related to …nancial litteracy.
3 Infrequent planners face more uncertainty since their consumption is predetermined.
In my general equilibrium model, the inattentive group su¤ers from an adverse correlation between asset prices and savings. This adverse "term-of-trade e¤ect" could lead to lower wealth. By setting a plan for consumption, an inattentive consumer will let her savings automatically adjust to the aggregate shock. In general, she will accumulate more assets when asset prices are high and reduce her asset holding when prices are low.
Since the main channel through which infrequent planning a¤ects the wealth distribution is an increase in uncertainty, it becomes crucial to distinguish between income and return uncertainty. It is well known that even in a standard consumption model with full attention these two sources of risk can a¤ect savings in opposite directions. Therefore, I develop two models with inattention to distinguish between these two di¤erent channels. First, I study the e¤ects of inattentiveness in a model where the only source of uncertainty is future income.
Then, I analyze the impact of infrequent planning in a model with uncertain asset returns and no income uncertainty.
I show that when the only source of uncertainty is future income, inattentive consumers still accumulate more wealth, despite trading at unfavorable prices. In contrast, when asset returns are uncertain, inattentive agents become poorer in the long-run. In this last case, infrequent planners optimally choose to invest less in the stock market.
Finally, I study the consequences of inattentiveness in a general equilibrium portfolio choice model that combines both sources of uncertainty. To shed light on the mechanisms be-
hind investment decisions, I analyze a stylized two-period model, where inattentive investors infrequently review their portfolios. In this set-up, infrequent planning induces inattentive agents to invest more in bonds and less in equities. Thus, inattentiveness can account for the …nding in Lusardi (2003) , namely that infrequent planners are less likely to hold stocks.
Turning to asset price implications, irrespective of the source of uncertainty, inattention generates more volatile asset returns than a representative agent model with full attention. This is because in general equilibrium asset prices must induce attentive consumers to voluntarily bear the burden of adjusting to aggregate shocks, since inattentive agents are unable to do so at non-planning periods. The inability of a standard consumption-based asset pricing model to reproduce the observed high volatility in asset returns is a well-known puzzle in the literature. 4 This paper contributes to this debate by suggesting a link between inattentiveness and asset price volatility.
Recently, one branch of literature has explored the sources of deviations from full information. Sims (2003) and Moscarini (2004) use Shannon's information theory to develop a theory of costly information acquisition (Rational Inattention). Reis (2006) studies a partial equilibrium consumption/saving model where the introduction of a cost of processing and acquiring information microfounds infrequent planning (Inattentiveness). Both Gabaix and Laibson (2002) and Abel et al. (2007) compute the optimal degree of inattention to the stock market. The latter …nd that even small observational costs can imply a substantial degree of inattention.
A di¤erent branch of literature has focused on the implication of near-rationality and infrequent planning without specifying the rationale behind it (e.g., Caballero (1995 ), Lynch (1996 ). The present paper is most closely connected to this branch since I abstract from planning costs and just postulate that a fraction of the population plans infrequently. However, my paper goes further by considering a general equilibrium model with endogenous asset prices. Mankiw and Reis (2006) analyze a general-equilibrium model where agents are inattentive when setting prices, wages, and consumption. However, it is assumed that agents can sign an insurance contract ensuring that they all have the same wealth at the beginning of each period. In contrast, my paper explicitly takes into account the consequences of infrequent planning on wealth heterogeneity.
The recent work of McKay (2008) is close to the spirit of my paper. McKay (2008) develops a framework where agents devote di¤erent levels of e¤ort when making their …nancial decisions. His model predicts a low degree of stock market participation among households who put minimal e¤ort into managing their portfolio.
Finally, the paper builds on the literature about incomplete markets with heterogenous agents and aggregate ‡uctuations (e.g. Den Haan (1996), Smith (1997, 1998) ), but departs from it by making propensity to plan the only source of heterogeneity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model with inatten-4 See e.g. LeRoy and Porter (1981) , Shiller (1981) or Heaton and Lucas (1996) 4 tiveness and income uncertainty. Section 3 analyzes a model where inattentive investors deal with return uncertainty. Section 4 studies the portfolio decisions of inattentive investors in general equilibrium. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
Inattentive Consumers
This section analyzes the impact of inattentiveness on the wealth distribution and asset prices in a model with bond trading and income risk. In this framework, it is possible to show that inattentiveness a¤ects wealth inequality through two di¤erent channels working in opposite directions. It increases the wealth accumulation of the inattentive group via precautionary savings motives and decreases it via negative "price e¤ects".
Predetermining their consumption, inattentive consumers must deal with greater uncertainty. As is standard in consumption theory, this implies an increase in wealth accumulation for precautionary reasons. On the other hand, in general equilibrium, bond prices must clear the market. At non-planning dates, a positive (negative) income shock pushes up (down) the demand for savings of both groups. However, inattentive consumers have a higher marginal propensity to save, since their savings respond one-to-one to the income shock (since consumption is predetermined). It follows that market-clearing prices must be pro-cyclical and that inattentive consumers trade at unfavorable prices. Interestingly, through this last channel, inattention makes bond prices more volatile than they would be in a model with full attention.
The model
Consider an incomplete markets economy with in…nite horizon and aggregate uncertainty as in Den Haan (2001), but modi…ed to introduce heterogeneity among consumers only in the frequency of their consumption plans. 5 More precisely, attentive consumers (A) behave as in a standard model, choosing consumption and saving plans at the same point in time.
Inattentive consumers (I) plan consumption every other period and let savings absorb in-come shocks. 6 To focus on the e¤ects of inattentiveness as the only source of heterogeneity, I abstract from idiosyncratic shocks. By looking at two groups of agents only, we can characterize the cross-sectional distribution of wealth by the average bond holdings of one of the two groups.
The attentive group has mass and total population size is normalized to one. Each household is endowed with income y, which follows an AR(1) process, and can smooth its consumption by trading a risk-free one-period bond b; in zero net-supply, at price q. To rule out equilibria which admit unbounded borrowing or Ponzi schemes, it is assumed that agents can go short in bonds only up to an exogenous limit, b. 78 All agents are price takers in the bond market. The set of relevant state variables (z) will di¤er between planning (P ) and non-planning (N P ) dates. At non-planning dates, consumption (c) of the inattentive group is predetermined and it a¤ects utility so that it will enter the policy functions as a state variable.
Attentive consumers plan period by period, solving the following problem:
where V P;A is the value function in planning periods, V N P;A is the value function in nonplanning periods and utility is CRRA U (c) =
6 Infrequent planning modi…es the standard consumption/saving model also in another important respect: choosing consumption or saving is no longer equivalent. Turning to the problem of an inattentive saver, i.e. an individual who chooses her savings every other period, di¤erences in planning times do not lead to wealth heterogeneity in general equilibrium with only aggregate shocks. In this set up, it is possible to show that both kinds of agents …nd it optimal to live hand-to-mouth and consume their income period by period. This result follows trivially from the assumptions that there are only aggregate shocks, that savings are in zero net supply and that agents are homogeneous ex ante. 7 In the calibration, I choose a level for the debt limit large enough so that the constraint is hardly ever binding. 8 In the numerical implementation of the model, instead of dealing with inequality constraints, I modi…ed the utility function introducing a penalty function to discourage agents to borrow beyond the limit. Following Judd et al. (2000b) , I used the following penalty function: 
Suppose now that inattentive consumers plan every other period. Then in t they plan consumption today and tomorrow while they remain inattentive during period t + 1: The problem of an inattentive consumer in planning periods will therefore be:
st : c
While, in a non-planning period, it is:
We can rewrite the problems in (2) and (3) in a more compact form,
From (4), it is possible to derive the following set of …rst-order conditions that holds in 9 To make sure that the constraint on b t+2 is satis…ed, in the numerical solution I imposed that it should be satis…ed in the worst possible case.
10 c I t+1 is predetermined one period in advance, which implies that E t U c
7 equilibrium:
As in Reis (2006) , the solution implies that the consumption of inattentive consumers follows a deterministic path between t and t + 1, (eq. (6)), but a stochastic Euler equation between t and t + 2 (eq. (5)), i.e., between the planning dates.
Finally, the model is closed with the usual market clearing conditions:
Numerical Solution
In the numerical implementation of the model, the income process is approximated by a three-state Markov chain, as in Christiano (1990) . To calibrate this process, I use the series "total compensation per employees" from the NIPA for the years 1952-2009 and estimate the following law of motion:
11 log y t = y log y t 1 + " yt :
The discount factor is calibrated at 0:98 to match an average return of 2%. The degree of risk aversion is equal to 1.5 and the dimension of the attentive group, ; is equal to
One period in the model corresponds to one year in the data. The …rst column in table 1 summarizes the parameters in the baseline case.
13 11 The series was detrended using a linear trend and divided by the total U.S. population and the CPI in each year to obtain real per capita income.
12 Lusardi (2003) …nds that one third of repondents in her sample has not made any …nancial plan about retirement. Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) report that the majoirty of repondents in their samples made few or no changes over time to their portfolio allocations. Here, I take a conservative stand an assume that one half of the population is inattentive. 13 To study the robustness of my results, I simulate the inattentiveness model under di¤erent parameter con…gurations. In particular, I evaluate the impact of changes in risk aversion, the discount factor and the 8
The solution to the model is a consumption rule for inattentive consumers at planning dates and two pricing rules, at planning and non-planning dates, as a function of the states, which satisfy the system of Euler equations given by (1), (5) and (6).
14 The model is solved numerically using collocation methods by approximating the policy functions with linear splines.
Inattentiveness introduces an additional computational challenge. In non-planning pe- for the price function q t+1 at non-planning dates along the equilibrium path. In contrast, at a planning date (t) ; the state space z 
Inattentiveness and income risk in general equilibrium
The …rst two columns of table 2 report the simulation results for the model described in the previous subsection. 16 To highlight the e¤ects of inattentiveness, table 2 compares the results of my model to an economy without inattention, i.e. populated by a continuum of representative agents. I persistence or volatility of the shock processes. The second column in table 1 reports the parameter values I used. The main results of the paper, in terms of wealth accumulation and asset prices volatility, remain unaltered using a di¤erent parameters con…guration.
14 The consumption rule for the attentive group can then be recovered by the market clearing conditions. 15 I created 5 parallel chains simulating the economy for 1,500,000 periods and disregarding the …rst 500,000 observations. The long time horizon was chosen to eliminate the e¤ects of initial conditions. The results in table 2 reports the average across these chains. 16 Although I cannot theoretically prove the existence of a stationary stochastic distribution, my numerical simulations indicate that the distribution is not degenerate. In the simulations agents are seldom close to the constraint. Moreover, whenever the constraint is hit, the economy quickly moves away from it.
refer to this last case as RA in the table. Absent idiosyncratic shocks, in such an economy, everybody lives hand-to-mouth consuming their income period by period. The second column in the table, I, reports the results for the model with inattention. Table 2 shows that when the income is the only source of uncertainty, inattentive consumers save more mean b I > 0 . The results thus resemble the partial equilibrium analysis in Reis (2006) , even though in general equilibrium inattentive consumers trade at unfavorable prices.
To shed further light on the results, …gures 1 and 2 illustrate the saving behavior of an inattentive consumer by graphing her bond accumulation as a function of initial bond holdings in planning (t) and non-planning periods (t + 1).
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First, analyze …gure 1. Consider a planning date when there is no cross-sectional dispersion in wealth so that both agents hold zero assets: b I t = 0 in the …gure. Even if both groups receive the same income shock, inattentive consumers face more uncertainty since they predetermine future consumption. This induces them to save more in planning periods for every realization of the shock for precautionary reasons b Next, consider …gure 2. At a non-planning date, one must distinguish between high and low realization of the income shock. For a good realization of the income shock (right panel), both agents would like to save in anticipation of future declines of income. However, the marginal propensity to save of the inattentive group is higher than that of the attentive group since they …xed their consumption one period in advance. Hence, their savings increase to satisfy the budget constraint and bond prices rise to keep the market in equilibrium. The opposite is true for a bad realization of the income shock (left panel). In that case, inattentive agents save less than attentive ones and bond prices decrease to clear the market.
A similar argument holds towards the lower end of wealth. In non-planning periods, the inattentive group accumulates bonds when income and bond prices are high and decreases its bond holdings when income and bond prices are low. 17 For illustration purposes, these …gures are plotted over a smaller grid for b Summarizing the results, with inattention and income risk, wealth accumulation is in‡uenced by two mechanisms working in opposite directions: precautionary saving and price e¤ects. Table 2 shows that the saving e¤ect prevails and the inattentive group accumulates on average more wealth than the attentive one. Moreover, inattentiveness increases asset price volatility.
The costs of inattentiveness
To evaluate the welfare consequences of inattentiveness, I assume that agents start out with zero bond holdings and derive the level of expected lifetime utility by simulating 1,000 parallel series of 1,000 periods for the two groups of agents (V j ; f or J = A; I).
For the sake of comparison, I also derive the expected lifetime utility that would arise in a model without inattentiveness, where the representative agent consumes her income period by period V RA : Table 2 reports losses in terms of utility and translated into consumption units, namely the certainty equivalent level of consumption necessary to attain the same level of expected lifetime utility:
for J = A; I; RA:
According to the results in table 2, the welfare costs of inattentiveness are very small. The di¤erences between the certainty equivalent consumption level of an attentive and an inattentive agent is about 0:02%.
The magnitude of these costs should not be very surprising. As a matter of fact, the results of this subsection can be seen as con…rming previous …ndings that welfare gains from eliminating aggregate ‡uctuations are small (Lucas (1987) ) and that losses due to small deviations from rationality are trivial (e.g. Cochrane (1989) , Pischke (1995) ). Idiosyncratic shocks, more uncertainty or longer periods of inattentiveness would probably magnify these costs.
Inattentive investors
The results from the previous section show that even in general equilibrium, higher uncertainty about future income induces inattentive consumers to accumulate more wealth in the long run. Thus, the empirical link between the propensity to plan and wealth accumulation mentioned in the introduction still appears to be a puzzle. However, if the source of uncertainty is asset returns rather than income, infrequent planning could lead to the opposite result in line with the empirical evidence. In this case more uncertainty may push the inattentive group to invest less in the risky asset and accumulate less wealth in general equilibrium. In this section, I present a simple model with return uncertainty to elucidate the mechanisms behind investment decisions in a general equilibrium model with inattentiveness.
The model
Consider an incomplete markets economy with in…nite horizon and aggregate uncertainty, where the only source of uncertainty is asset returns. More precisely, each household is endowed with a non-stochastic income stream y. Moreover, agents can trade a share of stock s; with price p; that provides a ‡ow of stochastic dividends, d. Stocks are in positive …xed supply, normalized to one.
As in the previous section, the economy is populated by attentive and inattentive agents.
The attentive group has mass and total population size is normalized to one. To rule out equilibria which admit unbounded borrowing or Ponzi schemes, a short-sales constraint, s 0; is imposed. 20 As explained in the previous section, the set of relevant state variables (z) will di¤er between planning (P ) and non-planning (N P ) dates.
Attentive investors plan period by period, solving the following problem:
In the calibration, the constraint is hardly ever binding. As in the income-risk model, I used a penalty function to impose that the constraint on s t+2 is satis…ed in the worse possible state.
where V P;A is the value function in planning periods, V N P;A is the value function in nonplanning periods and utility is CRRA.
In this case, a standard Euler equation applies:
Inattentive consumers plan their consumption only every other period, solving the following problem:
From (9), it is possible to derive the following set of Euler equations that holds in equilibrium:
c I t+1
Market clearing requires:
(1 ) c
Numerical Solution
The exogenous state of the economy is described by a Markov chain that captures the dynamic of the dividend shock. To calibrate this process, I use dividends data from the 14 NIPA for the years 1952-2009 and estimate the following law of motion 21 :
In the numerical implementation of the model, eq. (14) is approximated by a three-state Markov chain. To also capture other sources of wealth stemming from tradable assets, I
follow Heaton and Lucas (1996) . Therefore, I target a steady state ratio of non-labor income over total income As concerns the state space of the economy with return risk, a similar argument applies as in the income-risk model described in the previous section. Therefore, in the numerical implementation it is assumed that the space state at a non-planning date (t + 1) contains only d t ; s I t and d t+1 . In contrast, at a planning date (t) it is composed only by d t and s 
Inattentiveness and investment risk in general equilibrium
As shown in table 2, when the only source of uncertainty is return risk, inattentive investors choose to invest less in the risky asset and accumulate less wealth mean s I < 1 .
22 21 The dividends series was detrended using a linear trend and divided by the total U.S. population and the CPI in each year to obtain real per capita dividends. 22 Recall that s A = 2 s I :
15 What makes this model fundamentally di¤erent from the model described in the previous section is that now the amount of risk born by each agent is endogenously determined and increasing in their stock positions. In this case, facing more uncertainty, inattentive investors optimally choose to invest less in the risky asset. As a result, in the long run they will consume less, accumulate less wealth but experience a less volatile consumption path.
To understand the properties of this economy, it is useful to recall …rst what would happen in the absence of inattention in such an environment.
Without inattention or idiosyncratic shocks, the only di¤erence between the two agents is their initial stock holdings. If they are both endowed with the same amount of wealth (s = 1);
the model is recast into the representative agent framework of Lucas (1978) . Trivially, it follows that in equilibrium the total stock positions of all agents is equal to the aggregate number of shares and the share price is an expected discounted sum of future dividends. In this environment, identical agents do not trade, hence saving in equilibrium is equal to zero
Conversely, if agents are heterogenous with respect to initial stock holding, i.e. one half of the population is richer than the other, this heterogeneity will create incentives to trade.
By construction, the richer half of the population is more exposed to risk. To smooth their consumption, rich agents save procyclically and the stock price moves accordingly to clear the market. Consider a planning date when there is no cross-sectional dispersion in wealth so that both agents hold one share each : s I t = 1 in …gure 3. Even though both agents receive the same aggregate dividend shock, inattentive investors face more uncertainty since they predetermine future consumption. In contrast to the economy with income uncer-tainty, this induces them to save less in planning periods for every realization of the shock
This result, counterintuitive at …rst, is better understood recalling that even without inattention, an increase in return risk can lead to a decrease in savings. With return uncertainty, two counterbalancing forces are at work. On one hand more uncertainty increases savings for precautionary reasons. On the other hand, it decreases demand for the risky asset by risk-averse investors. 24 Infrequently planning their consumption pro…le, inattentive investors perceive the stock as more volatile and will choose to invest less in this asset.
For increased wealth dispersion, inattentive investors' behavior partially resembles the model without inattention: they invest in stocks pro-cyclically towards the higher end of wealth and vice versa. As in the income-risk model, asset prices are procyclical.
Overall, the di¤erence between this economy and the economy with full attention is not quantitatively large at planning periods. 25 It is useful to turn to non-planning periods to understand the full picture. At non-planning dates, with low wealth dispersion, inattentive investors'stock holdings accommodate dividend movements to satisfy the budget constraint and prices move accordingly to clear the market. Thus, also in this case, infrequent planners save procyclically and trade at unfavorable prices. They will buy more stocks when prices are high and sell when prices are low. The term-of-trade e¤ect described in the previous section is also in force in this case.
Precautionary saving, investment risk and price e¤ects are mechanisms that a¤ect wealth accumulation in two di¤erent directions. Simulation results show that the last two e¤ects prevail and that inattentive investors accumulate less wealth than attentive ones in the longrun. By accumulating less wealth, on average they consume less but they also smooth their consumption better. 24 Reis (2009) makes this point clear in a representative agent model where the only source of income is investment in a risky asset. Gollier and Kimball (1996) show that with CRRA utility, the opportunity to invest in a risky asset increases savings only if risk aversion is lower than one. 25 Without inattentiveness, …gure 3 would look similar but the three plotted curves would cross at zero for s = 1:
As in the income risk case, with inattention asset prices become more volatile and less autocorrelated. More speci…cally, inattention increases returns volatility by 30%.
26 Again, this increase implies an improvement with respect to a representative agent model, even though asset returns are still much more volatile in the data (16%).
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The costs of inattentiveness
To also evaluate the welfare consequences of inattentiveness in a model with return risk, I
proceed as described in the previous section and assume that agents start out holding one share each. I also derive the expected lifetime utility that would arise in a model without inattentiveness, where the representative agent lives hand-to-mouth, period by period. Table   2 shows the results.
As in the income risk model, inattentive investors are worse o¤ compared to both attentive investors and the representative agents. On the other hand, as opposed to the income risk case, attentive investors now experience a much more volatile consumption path and a lower level of welfare than in the representative agent case. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that with return risk the cost of inattentiveness is one order of magnitude lower than in the model with income risk, thus suggesting that even minor planning costs will rationalize infrequent planning.
A portfolio problem with inattention
The previous two sections show that, in a model with inattention, income and return risk have opposite e¤ects on wealth accumulation while both increase asset prices volatility. It comes therefore natural to wonder how the presence of both kinds of risk would modify this conclusion.
A growing literature looks at the implication of planning costs on optimal portfolio decisions. Both Lynch (1996) and Gabaix and Laibson (2002) 27 To generate this …gure, I used the long term stock, bond, interest rates and consumption data available from Robert Shiller's webpage. Heaton and Lucas (1996) report a similar number. planning on investment decisions. More recently, Abel et al. (2009) evaluate the impact of both transaction and information costs on the optimal degree of inattention to the stock market. What all these papers have in common is that they consider partial equilibrium frameworks. Little can therefore be said on wealth dispersion or asset prices volatility in such environments. In this section, I tackle this issue in general equilibrium, combining the two models of the previous sections.
Portfolio problems in incomplete market settings have been intensively studied. Judd et al. (2000a) and Judd et al. (2002) review some of the computational problems attached to these set-ups. Inattention makes things harder since it increases both the dimension of the state space and the number of equations to be solved. For the sake of tractability, I limit my analysis to a two-period model that can be easily solved numerically and clearly illustrates the main mechanisms between inattention and portfolio choices. : The maximization problem faced by an attentive investor is therefore:
The model
The problem in (15) yields the following …rst-order conditions:
The maximization problem for an inattentive investor is:
leading to the following optimality conditions:
The model is closed with the usual market clearing conditions: The model in this section di¤ers from the previous two in two respects: agents can now invest in more than one asset and there are two sources of risk. To separate the e¤ects of these two channels, I …rst study a model with one asset but no income risk. I then reintroduce income volatility and evaluate the e¤ect of this channel.
Results
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First, consider the model described above but where the only source of uncertainty is asset returns, y H = y L = 0. I refer to this model as "Return Risk" in table 3. Facing higher uncertainty in asset returns, the inattentive group saves more in bonds and less in equities compared to the attentive group. Moreover, inattention increases both the level and the volatility of both the risky (r 0 ) and the risk-free r f return. These conclusions hold irrespective of the degree of risk aversion.
Interestingly, inattentiveness increases the risk premium because attentive agents now demand a higher premium for bearing the macroeconomic risk. However, as in a standard representative agent model, risk aversion plays a central role in determining the size of this e¤ect. When risk aversion is high, the increase in the risk premium induced by inattentiveness is large enough to impoverish inattentive investors, given their portfolio composition.
This implies that only for a high degree of risk aversion, > 10; will attentive investors accumulate the most wealth. 28 Nevertheless, even in this last case the di¤erence between the risk premium in the model with inattentiveness and the one generated in a representative agent setting is only 0:4%. Moreover, this increase comes at the expense of implausibly high returns, showing again a connection between the risk premium and the risk-free rate puzzles.
29
Now, introduce income risk. I refer to this model as "Return and Labor Income Risk" in table 3. As before, regardless of the degree of risk aversion, inattention induces inattentive agents to sell equities and buy bonds and it increases asset prices volatility. However, now the e¤ects of inattention on risk premium are even more muted (leading to di¤erences of less than 0:01% in the three cases). It follows that, even for a high degree of risk aversion, inattentive agents accumulate more wealth. This last result is better understood recalling the …ndings in Polkovnichenko (2004) . In that paper, it is shown that the implications of limited stock market participation for the equity premium are marginal if shareholders are endowed not only with capital income, but also with labor income.
To summarize the results, in a portfolio choice model with both income and return risk, inattentive investors invest less in the stock market while accumulating more bonds. Even with two sources of risk, asset prices are more volatile. Thus, inattentiveness can explain the link between infrequent planning and limited stock market participation, but cannot account for the lower saving rate of infrequent planners observed in the data.
Conclusions
This paper explores the links between the propensity to plan, wealth inequality and asset prices in general equilibrium. In a simple endowment economy where agents receive equal income or dividend streams, di¤erences in the propensity to plan generate wealth heterogeneity and volatile asset prices. Attentive agents plan their consumption pattern period by period, while inattentive ones plan every other period. In a partial equilibrium model with …xed interest rates, Reis (2006) shows that inattentive consumers face more uncertainty and save more for precautionary reasons. Here, I show that in general equilibrium, inattentive consumers will trade at unfavorable prices. This negative term of trade e¤ect might potentially lead to lower wealth. However, even in general equilibrium, inattentive consumers accumulate claims on attentive ones if the only source of risk is income. In contrast, they accumulate less wealth when they can trade only in a risky asset.
In my model, asset returns are much more volatile than in a representative agent model with full attention. This is due to the fact that, in general equilibrium, prices must induce attentive agents to voluntarily bear the whole burden of adjusting to aggregate income shocks. Thus, my simple model suggests a natural link between infrequent planning and the high volatility of stock returns observed in the data.
According to my …ndings, inattentiveness can replicate the empirical evidence in Lusardi (2003) and explain the limited stock market participation of infrequent planners. However, it cannot account for the observed positive relationship between propensity to plan and savings rate.
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Inattentiveness captures only one of the channels through which propensity to plan in‡uences wealth accumulation: infrequent planning increases uncertainty concerning future income or future asset returns. My results suggest that in order to replicate the empirical ev-30 See, e.g., Ameriks et al. (2003) .
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idence in Ameriks et al. (2003) , the standard consumption/saving model should also be modi…ed in other dimensions besides introducing heterogeneity in the propensity to plan. In the behavioral literature, undersaving is often related to self-control problems (e.g. O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999), ). Ameriks et al. (2003) suggest that present bias preferences could turn infrequent planners into overspenders.
Exploring these di¤erent channels is left to future research. 
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